This paper studies inherited agglomeration effects, how human capital that accrues to managers while working at a parent firm in an industry hub can be subsequently transferred to a spinoff. We test for inherited agglomeration effects in the context of the hedge fund industry and find that hedge fund managers who previously worked in New York and London outperform their peers who worked elsewhere previously by 10-14 basis points per month or about 1.5% per year. The results are driven by managers who worked in investment management positions previously, and are at least as large as traditional agglomeration effects that arise from being located in an industry hub contemporaneously. The evidence suggests that inherited agglomeration effects are an important, but as yet overlooked, factor influencing the performance of new firms.
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurial spawning, the founding of new companies by employees of incumbent ("parent") firms, is a key driver of entrepreneurial activity in the economy (Bhide, 2000) , and an important branch of the literature has shed light on the phenomena and its antecedents (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar 2004; Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005) . While it is well established that the resources an entrepreneur brings to a spawn at founding impact the performance of the new venture (Stinchcombe 1965; Boeker, 1988 Boeker, , 1989 , and that new firms are shaped by the experience entrepreneurs gain through prior employment (e.g., Dencker, Gruber and Shah, 2009; Fern, Cardinal and O'Neil, 2011) , there is still much we do not know about how managers' prior employment experience influences the performance of entrepreneurial spawns. Yet understanding why some new firms thrive while others fail is of great importance for scholars and practitioners alike. Indeed, Helfat and Lieberman (2002) write that "surprisingly little is known about [the birth of capabilities and resources within organizations], despite its centrality to the understanding of firm evolution" (p.725). More recently Chatterji (2009) highlights the need for more research on how parent firm characteristics influence the performance of spawns, writing "it would be interesting to attempt to further differentiate between . . . parent firms . . . (as) there is more work to be done in comparing the performance of spawns based on the characteristics of their parent firm" (p.202), an observation echoed by Fern, Cardinal and O'Neil (2011) This paper examines an intuitive, but largely overlooked, channel through which performance effects are transferred from parent firms to new firms: inherited agglomeration effects-the economic benefits that accrue to managers while working at a parent firm in an industry hub that can be subsequently transferred to a spinoff, regardless of where the new venture is located. 1 We use the term "inherited" agglomeration effects to emphasize that the economic benefits of agglomeration are appropriated and transmitted from parent firms in industry hubs via managers who leave to manage spawns and to distinguish between this effect and traditional agglomeration effects. 2 While there is a large and prominent literature examining how a new venture's location in an industry hub influences its performance (e.g., Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) , there is little research on how parent firm 1 We use the terms spawn and spinoff interchangeably throughout. 2 Traditional agglomeration effects are economic benefits firms enjoy concurrently from being physically located in an industry hub. While we also measure traditional agglomeration effects in our empirical application, our main interest is with inherited agglomeration effects.
agglomeration influences new venture performance. Yet, given the broad agreement in the literature that parent firms influence spawn performance, and that agglomeration effects influence parent firm capabilities and resources, it would seem to be of great importance to understand how inherited agglomeration effects contribute to new venture performance. In this paper, we lay out the conceptual basis for inherited agglomeration effects and test for evidence that such effects exist and are moderated by relevant experience. In doing so, we develop a new and powerful lens for understanding how new venture performance is influenced by the characteristics of managers' parent firms. Furthermore, inherited agglomeration effects also help to explain how human capital diffuses outside of industry hubs into peripheral regions through entrepreneurial spawning and employee mobility.
Our conceptual approach integrates research on entrepreneurial spawning and agglomeration to examine how inherited agglomeration effects increase the commercial value of a nascent entrepreneur's human capital when they are still an employee of an incumbent firm.
Specifically, we propose that when a firm in an industry hub benefits from agglomeration effects, employees of the firm will develop valuable human capital that may be subsequently transmitted to new ventures. 3 We test the implications of inherited agglomeration effects in the context of the global hedge fund industry. The hedge fund industry is a good setting for a study of inherited agglomeration effects for three reasons. First, the industry is characterized by high rates of new venture formation over the last three decades, which provides us with a wealth of new ventures to study.
Second, as with many professional services firms, hedge funds are knowledge intensive
businesses; yet, there is very limited formal intellectual property protection in the industry.
Thus, it is straightforward to suppose that an economically meaningful amount of a manager's human capital acquired at a closely related parent firm is general and transferable to a hedge fund. Finally, hedge fund performance can be measured with a relatively high degree of accuracy, even for very young firms, which provides us with a more precise measure of spawn performance than firm survival (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004) and pre-money valuation (Chatterji, 2009 ).
We find that hedge funds whose principal managers were previously employed by parent firms located in financial services industry hubs-New York or London-outperform their peers by about 1.5% per year, net of fees, an effect that is at least as large as "traditional"
contemporaneous agglomeration effects. In other words, we find that the location where a future hedge fund manager spends her early career is as important as where she locates her hedge fund.
The results are robust to the inclusion of fixed effects for the major ("bulge bracket") investment banks and to controls for manager selection into New York and London employment, based on all observable dimensions of parent firms, hedge funds and managers. Interestingly, the inherited agglomeration effect stems most strongly from managers whose prior employment was in investment management, the job type most closely related to hedge fund management.
We also distinguish between two potential mechanisms underlying inherited agglomeration effects: knowledge-based effects and social capital effects. Knowledge-based inherited agglomeration effects arise if individuals who work at the center of an industry are exposed to valuable ideas and techniques that others are less likely to observe (Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1992; Bell and Zaheer, 2007) . Social capital-based inherited agglomeration effects arise when an individual working at a firm in an industry hub is exposed to customers and suppliers who may be critical to the success of a new venture (Saxenian 1994a (Saxenian , 1994b Hellmann, 2007) . When individuals who have worked in industry hubs leave their parent firms to lead an entrepreneurial spawn, they take their unique knowledge and contacts with them, and consequently the commercial value of their human and social capital becomes part of the new firm's initial resource base. Thus, both mechanisms potentially can drive inherited agglomeration effects. We design an empirical test that helps distinguish between knowledge-based effects and social capital effects. We find that inherited agglomeration effects are stronger in hedge funds engaged in direct investment activities compared to fund-of-funds, which suggests that inherited agglomeration effects are mainly driven by the transference of technical trading knowledge in the hedge fund industry.
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT

Entrepreneurial spawning
The powerful observation that successful entrepreneurs tend to come from good parent firms (Burton, Sorenson and Beckman, 2002) points directly to the idea that valuable economic resources are often transferred from parent firms to spawns through the conduit of the entrepreneur. Given that firms are fundamentally shaped by their founding conditions (Stinchcombe 1965; Boeker 1988 Boeker , 1989 Johnson, 2007) , the idea that parent firm quality matters is compelling; but, if coming from good stock is important for new ventures, it raises a fundamental question about which parent firm characteristics impact spawn performance.
The extant literature on entrepreneurial spawning evaluates three sources of potential parent firm characteristics that might influence spawn performance: access to technical knowledge, access to social capital and access to managerial systems. By providing a platform for managers to accumulate relevant technical knowledge, parent firms provide a crucial training ground for nascent entrepreneurs who strike out into related ventures (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2009; Elfenbein, Hamilton and Zenger, 2010) . For example, spawns in the semiconductor and disk drive industries exploited technological knowledge gained through managers' previous employers to outperform firms that entered from outside the industry (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco and Sarkar, 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006) , and Gruber, MacMillan and Thompson (2008) find that serial entrepreneurs are able to navigate alternative markets for new technologies more effectively due to their prior experiences with related technologies.
Since parent firms provide a platform for employees to develop social ties, social capital can also be transferred between parent firms and spawns, which may facilitate successful entrepreneurship (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Gulati and Higgins 2003 Thus, the literature on entrepreneurial spawning makes clear that when managers are able to increase their human capital by appropriating technical knowledge, social capital and knowledge of managerial systems from parent firms, those managers are more likely to be successful as entrepreneurs. While the extant literature demonstrates that prior employment influences the human capital of nascent entrepreneurs, the origins of parent firms' resources-the technical and managerial knowledge embedded in the firm and the position of the firm's employees in crucial social networks-from which the entrepreneur appropriates human capital are less well understood. This paper builds on the idea that human capital is transferable from a parent firm to a spawn, and extends the literature on spawning by examining how the location of an entrepreneur's parent firm in an industry hub can be an important driver of spawn performance via the influence of agglomeration on the entrepreneur's human capital.
Agglomeration effects
Marshall's (1920) seminal work on agglomeration proposes three potential reasons why certain industries tend to cluster in localized areas: (i) access to knowledge spillovers; (ii) access to thick labor markets; and (iii) better access to "implements and materials" from suppliers,
where all three benefits of agglomeration are due to reduced costs of acquiring ideas, or factor inputs, due to physical proximity.
Recent scholarly work focused on cluster formation and the performance of firms within clusters has generated a wealth of evidence in support of the three Marshallian (1920) factors.
For example, Braun and MacDonald's (1982) pioneering work on the rise of the semiconductor industry, discusses how the benefits of knowledge spillovers accrued to firms located in Silicon valley through individual worker's social networks, writing on pp.128-129:
The advantages of one semiconductor company gains from the proximity of others are considerable. In such a highly competitive industry, it is vital to keep abreast of the latest technology and commercial developments. . . . The concentration of semiconductor companies in Silicon Valley provides excellent conditions for the transfer of knowledge. The industry is founded on expertise and survives by replenishing this expertise with the help of individuals possessing the latest, appropriate knowledge. Whether this is achieved by an informal chat on the golf course between employees of different firms, or by hiring an expert from another semiconductor company, the transfer of knowledge must always be more easily accomplished when firms are as close together as they are in the Santa Clara Valley. Friendships are more readily made among people in the same business in regular contact with each other, and a move to a new job is often much more attractive if it does not mean moving house, changing the children's schools and finding new friends. So important is contact between individual experts seen to be in this industry that the Wagon Wheel Bar at the corner of Whisman Road and Middlefield Avenue in Silicon Valley has been spoken of -not completely in jest -as the fountainhead of the semiconductor industry.
Support for the idea that knowledge spillovers underlie agglomeration effects also comes from a series of large sample empirical papers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) show that patent citations tend to cluster locally, suggesting that knowledge remains tied to specific geographies. Klepper and Sleeper (2005) and Klepper (2007) document that spawns, particularly knowledge-driven spawns in innovative industries, tend to locate close to their parents, suggesting that knowledge spillovers tend to create and reinforce agglomeration effects.
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The benefit of labor pooling is, perhaps, the most intuitive of the three agglomeration factors.
Marshall (1920) describes how risk reduction from concentrating employers and employees facilitated specialization, writing:
[A] localized industry gains a great advantage from the fact that it offers a constant market for skill. Employers are apt to resort to any place where they are likely to find a good choice of workers with the special skill which they require; while men seeking employment naturally go to places where there are many employers who need such skill as theirs and where therefore it is likely to find a good market. The owner of an isolated factory, even if he has access to a plentiful supply of general labour, is often put to great shifts for want of some special skilled labour; and a skilled workman, when thrown out of employment in it, has no easy refuge. (Ch. 4, Section 3).
Modern scholars have emphasized the related idea that specialization of the labor pool improves the matching of jobs and skills between workers and firms (Helsley and Strange, 1990) . While much of the early evidence in support of Marshall's (1920) thick labor markets hypothesis was somewhat indirect, recent establishment-level data have borne out this effect as well (Dahl and Klepper, 2008; Ellison, Glaeser and Kerr, 2010) Marshall's (1920) third source of agglomeration effects, better access to intermediary inputs, has also received considerable attention at least since Stigler (1951) argued that firms can take advantage of the division of labor in certain functions by outsourcing specialized functions to 4 While the agglomeration effects literature has largely focused on reinforcing agglomeration effects within an industry hub, Berchicci, King and Tucci (2011) note that "a surprising number of spin-outs choose to move away" from their parent firms, and find that spawns that enter unrelated markets, or those targeting less advanced technological positions, tend to locate further afield. Inherited agglomeration effects offer another, complementary, reason why spin-offs might successfully locate away from their parent firm.
"auxiliary" suppliers who "must operate in intimate cooperation and seldom do so efficiently at a distance" (p.192). Saxenian (1994a) In principle, inherited agglomeration effects could obtain via a manager who worked for any firm subject to traditional agglomeration effects in an industry's geographical hub prior to joining a new venture. However, the literature suggests that some forms of prior employment will be more valuable than others. In particular, one should expect that a new venture will benefit more when a manager's previous job was more closely related to the new venture's operations because managers working in closely related functions will bring more relevant human capital to the new venture (Aldrich, 1999) . Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 2: Inherited agglomeration effects will be greater when a manager's pre-founding experience is more closely related to a new venture's operations.
EMPIRICAL CONTEXT: THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
We test our hypotheses in the context of the global hedge fund industry. Hedge funds are private investment vehicles that raise capital from high net worth individuals and institutional investors to exploit investment opportunities. As private investment vehicles, hedge funds are not subject to the same rules and regulations that govern mutual funds, giving them more investment flexibility. However, private investment vehicles are not allowed to market themselves to the general public. We exploit the fact that hedge funds report a substantial amount of information about their managers and performance as an indirect marketing tool, and use this information to analyze how the location of hedge fund managers' previous employers influences the post-founding performance of hedge fund spawns.
The hedge fund industry emerged as an important sub-sector of the financial services industry in the 1980s, though the first hedge fund was founded in 1949 by Alfred W. Jones. The industry has subsequently undergone rapid expansion, with compound annual growth in assets under management above 15% to approximately $1.7 trillion in 2010 (Hedge Fund Research, 2010) . It is particularly noteworthy that the hedge fund sector has witnessed significant entrepreneurial activity over the past three decades: our estimates, based on industry data and discussions with hedge fund managers, suggest that at least 10,000-12,000 hedge fund firms have been founded since 1978.
Part of the reason for the remarkable number of new ventures formed in the hedge fund industry is undoubtedly the lack of intellectual property protections over investment strategies, which allows individuals to appropriate knowledge applicable to hedge funds while working at a parent firm involved in trading, investing, wealth management and/or risk management. For example, traders at Goldman Sach's risk arbitrage desk, famously led by Robert Rubin, spawned
Farallon, TPG-Axon, Eton Park, Taconic, Och Ziff, and Perry, amongst others. 5 Thus, our emphasis on a manager's opportunity to learn and network while an employee of a parent firm in New York or London as a key mechanism behind the appropriation (and subsequent transference) of agglomeration effects seems warranted.
Of course, not all knowledge an employee gains at a parent firm is transferable, even in a service firm with limited intellectual property protections. For example, Groysberg, Lee and Nanda (2008) find that when star security analysts move to a new firm their external ranking typically declines, suggesting that when firm-specific (or team-specific) knowledge is a crucial input into performance, valuable knowledge may not be readily transferable across firms (i.e., without a "lift out"). While our context is broadly similar to Groysberg, et al (2008) York and London acquires non-zero amounts of generalized human capital applicable to hedge fund management, the hedge fund they found/join could be subject to inherited agglomeration effects. And, if a New York or London manager's generalized human capital is significantly larger than the amount acquired by managers working outside of New York and London, the empirical evidence will support inherited agglomeration effects. Thus, even in the presence of substantial parent-firm-specific human capital one could still expect to find inherited agglomeration effects.
Aside from the ability to appropriate generalized knowledge of hedge fund operations and strategy, and intrinsic factors such as more autonomy and flexibility, a key driver for individuals leaving their current jobs to found and manage hedge funds is the attractiveness of the external environment; some hedge fund managers are amongst the most highly remunerated professionals in the world. Given the lack of secure intellectual property and the attractiveness of the external environment for nascent hedge fund entrepreneurs, the conditions in the hedge fund industry fit closely with Hellmann's (2007) "entrepreneurial equilibrium," where individuals tend to explore ideas through external ventures. And indeed the hedge fund industry is remarkably entrepreneurial, which makes for a particularly interesting and important context in which to study entrepreneurial spawning. Moreover, given the knowledge intensity and lack of intellectual property protection, the hedge fund sector appears representative of many other service sectors in the economy.
Broadly, hedge funds are classified into five broad investment styles: "macro funds" invest in financial securities based on global macro-economic trends; "equity long/short funds" invest in equities just as a mutual fund might do, but also engage in short selling when they believe a firm is overvalued; "event-driven funds" invest in financial securities based on corporate events; "relative value funds" exploit securities mispricing; and "fund-of-funds" invest in other hedge funds. However, within each investment style, a number of (often overlapping) trading strategies exist, which dampens the importance of differences between firm's stated trading strategies.
Hedge funds firms derive their revenue from management and incentive fees. Management fees are annual asset management fees, based on the net asset value of the assets under management (AUM). The usual management fee, in our sample period, was around 2% of AUM. Incentive fees entitle the hedge fund firm to a percentage of the achieved investment return, usually subject to high water marks (no incentive fees are paid until an investor's net asset value exceeds their initial investment). Typically, incentive fees are 15-20% of gross returns. In our analysis, we focus on hedge fund performance as reported to their investors.
In other words, we analyze returns net of management and incentive fees, rather than attempting to calculate returns to the hedge fund managers themselves. While estimating returns to managers would also be interesting, it would require additional assumptions about investment timing, high water marks and cost structure. Because we do not observe these factors, we confine ourselves to analyzing a firm's performance to its investors.
DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN Sample construction
Data on hedge fund performance, location, size and inception date were obtained by combining the two most extensive and widely used hedge fund databases: Lipper-TASS Table 1 shows the characteristics of the 25 most prolific parent firms in our sample.
The information ratio
Consistent with the existing finance literature on hedge fund performance, we use firms' Information Ratios (IR) as our dependent variable (Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai, 2008) . To obtain the information ratio, we estimate abnormal returns, as the difference between fund i's actual return fund at time t and the fund's expected return, using equation (1):
where R i is a fund's monthly raw return, net of fees charged to investors, and the vector X contains factors that form the fund's expected return. Equation (1) captures the abnormal return of hedge funds by taking into account eight hedge fund specific factors in the vector X, seven factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004) and a liquidity risk exposure factor from Pástor and Stambaugh (2002) . 9 In equation (1), the term a i is the time invariant component of a fund's performance (fund alpha) and e is the residual. We estimate fund alphas and factor loadings by running fund-level longitudinal regressions. After estimating the fund-level alphas, we compute the fund's information ratio by dividing the fund alpha by the standard deviation of the fund's excess returns (fund alpha plus the residual). Since the information ratio adjusts a fund's performance measured relative to systematic risk exposure by its idiosyncratic risk exposure, the information ratio offers some conceptual advantages over fund alpha in our context. To control for outliers, we windsorize the 8-factor fund alphas and information ratios at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. We then compute firm-level information ratios by averaging across all the funds in the same firm, weighting each fund's returns by its assets under management.
Parent firm location
Our key independent variable measures the location of a hedge fund manager's previous employer. Specifically, we capture whether the headquarters of a manager's previous employer (parent firm) was in one of the geographical hubs of the financial service industry-New York or
London. 10 We measure parent firm location as a binary variable, PARENT_CENTER, which equals 1 if the location of the previous employer is New York City or London and 0 otherwise.
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PARENT_CENTER is a coarse explanatory variable as it picks up the appropriable component of the sum of all three Marhsallian (1920) sources of agglomeration effects that a nascent entrepreneur can transfer from a parent firm to a spawn. In other words, the coefficient estimate on PARENT_CENTER is an estimate of the net effect of: agglomeration effects at the parent firm level, appropriation of the benefits of agglomeration at the individual level within a parent firm and the transference of appropriated agglomeration effects from parent to spawn via an entrepreneurial manager.
In order to understand inherited agglomeration effects at a deeper level, we also characterize hedge fund managers' previous experience as being more or less closely related to hedge fund 10 New York and London account for the world's largest equity, debt and derivatives markets and have been ranked as the top two global financial centers by the Global Financial Centers Index and the Worldwide Centers of Commerce Index in every year these indices were compiled. The results are robust to allowing New York and London location dummies to enter separately. 11 In the absence of more detailed information on the exact location of the manager's previous employment, the previous employer's headquarters location is a frequently used proxy in the entrepreneurial spawning literature for the location of the entrepreneur's previous employment (Klepper and Simons, 2000; Gompers, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2005) . In our sample, this proxy seems reasonable as the vast majority of individuals worked for wholesale, corporate and investment banking divisions of financial institutions and these divisions are frequently colocated with the institutions' headquarters. Although there is undoubtedly some measurement error in our explanatory variable PARENT_CENTER because some individuals in our sample did not work at their firm's headquarters, the effect of misclassification errors in PARENT_CENTER would bias our results toward zero. Aigner (1973) shows that misclassification of a binary explanatory variable always leads to a coefficient that is biased toward zero as long as the classification error is uncorrelated with the regression disturbance term. In our case, the most plausible way in which this assumption would be violated would be if firms headquartered outside of New York and London systematically assigned workers with the highest unobservable abilities (to the econometrician) to their New York or London offices. However, even if misclassification is correlated with the disturbance term in this way, the bias on the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER will be toward zero because the effect of this type of misclassified high ability workers will be to increase the mean performance of worker's job spells in the control (non-PARENT_CENTER) population.
operations to see if inherited agglomeration effects increase with closely related work experience, as predicted by the theory. While almost all of the managers in our sample worked in finance in some capacity before starting or joining a hedge fund, interviews with industry experts suggest that investment management-investing in financial securities or active management of investments-is the type of job most closely related to hedge fund management.
Thus, if our theory is correct, and inherited agglomeration effects are an important driver of heterogeneity in the quality of entrepreneurial spawns, then we should see that managers with investment management experience should be the most important transmitters of agglomeration effects between parent firms and hedge fund spawns.
To create an investment manager dummy variable, we coded as "1" any parent firm job spell in financial securities trading (third party or proprietary trading), mutual fund management, asset management, trust management, wealth management, private banking, pension fund management/institutional investor fund management, hedge fund/alternative investment management. Non-investment management job spells were coded as zero, including any other finance or non-finance related job, most notably corporate finance professionals, brokers, research analysts, commercial bankers, consultants, lawyers, accountants and academics. 12 We interact the investment manager dummy variable with PARENT_CENTER to create a variable that measures the marginal effect of closely related experience on hedge fund performance. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the dependent, independent and control variables at the job spell level. The average information ratio is 0.27, or 27 basis points per month (3.24%/year), with a standard deviation of 28 basis points per month. 58% of job spells were in 12 Two research assistants coded job types independently of each other. We checked for consistency of the two coding entries, and had the individuals re-code any discrepancies. There was an 84% agreement rate for the coding schemes between the two research assistants, and Cohen's kappa was 0.78, which fall within to the "excellent" agreement range (>0.75) according to Fleiss (1981, p.218) , and within the "substantial agreement" range (0.61-0.80) according to Landis and Koch (1977) .
New York or London (PARENT_CENTER), and 43% of job spells were in investment management. To examine whether performance effects are correlated with parent firm location in the raw data, we perform a t-test on the information ratio generated by spawns from managers who previously worked for incumbents in New York or London, compared to firms with managers that were not from New York or London, and find that former outperform by 4 basis points per month and the difference is quite close to the traditional 5% cut-off for statistical significance (the t-statistic on the difference is 1.94).
- Table 2 about here
Control variables
As indicated by Table 2 , we include three types of control variables in our analyses: manager controls, job spell controls and hedge fund controls. We use educational background measures to control for managers' ability before their employment spells with parent firms. Chevalier and Ellison's (1997) find that mutual fund manager performance is correlated with the median SAT score of the undergraduate educational institution they attended. We, therefore, include in all of our specifications the median SAT score of each manager's undergraduate educational institution as well as a set of dummy variables for their highest educational level achieved.
13 36% of the job spells, in our sample, were associated with managers who held an MBA degree, 4% were associated with managers with Ph.Ds, 2% were associated with managers with a law degree and 11% held other postgraduate degrees.
We control for parent firm quality, using two direct measures of parent firm performance, whether the parent firm was ranked as a top 25 securities trading firm in any year 2000-2007 by 13 The mean SAT score by job spell is 1335 for the 47% of job spells we have data on (Table 2) . 16% of the job spells are associated with individuals who matriculated from an undergraduate institution outside of the U.S., and we do not have educational records for 37% job spells in our sample. We, therefore, use a spline of the quintiles of institutions' SAT scores along with a missing SAT score dummy variable in our empirical tests.
Institutional Investor Magazine (RANKED), 14 and the parent firm's long-run average Tobin's Q.
The Institutional Investor ranking is considered a good benchmark by industry experts for identifying high-quality trading firms. Since hedge funds are typically heavily engaged in securities trading, we include this measure to control for the quality of a manager's parent firm's trading capabilities. Tobin's Q provides a measure of how much market value a firm has created, which offers another measure of parent firm quality. The average Tobin's Q in our sample was 1.21, which means the average job spell was associated with a firm whose market value was 21% higher than the book value of the firm's assets. We also include a control for the effects of industry relatedness between a parent firm and their spawns' performance, using a dummy variable based on whether the manager's job spell was in the financial industry, measured by the first digit of the parent firm's primary SIC code (SIC6).
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We also include hedge fund controls in our specifications, including controls for firm location, scope, size, age and location. To control for traditional agglomeration effects, we introduce a binary variable, HF_CENTER, which is set equal to one if the hedge fund is based in New York or London, and zero otherwise. We also include a binary variable, "hedge fund near center," set equal to one if the hedge fund is within 100 miles of New York or London, and zero otherwise, as many hedge funds are located close to New York City, or to London. Scope is measured as the log average number of funds in the hedge fund firm (equal weighted by month), (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) ; Institutional Investor Alpha Securities Trading Ranking (2006, 2007) . While 74% of the job spells come from banks that were ranked in the top 25, only 25% of the parent firms in the sample were ranked in the top 25. After including bulge bracket dummies, only 53% of the sample outside of the bulge bracket came from ranked firms, and 19% of the firms. The results are robust to allowing RANKED to enter as a count of the number of a times a firm was included in the top 25 trading firms in Institutional Investor. 15 SIC codes beginning with 6 are in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate division. 94% of the job spells were associated with firms whose primary SIC code began with a "6". Unfortunately, multi-digit SIC codes appear to be rather imprecise in the financial services industry, so we did not include more refined SIC code dummies in our main analysis. However, similar results were obtained using two-digit SIC code dummies.
size is measured as the monthly average firm-level aggregate assets under management (AUM) and age is measured as years since the firm was founded until exiting the sample or until the end of the sample period, whichever was later. 46% of jobs spells are related to hedge funds located in New York or London, and 14% are associated with hedge funds that located near (but not in)
New York City or London. The mean scope, size and age, by job spell, in our sample, are 4.1 funds, $66M of AUM, and 7.35 years, respectively (Table 2) .
Empirical design
In the ideal experiment we would randomly assign individuals to job spells at parent firms and then to senior management positions in hedge funds. In practice we must base our statistical tests on self-selected populations. Although we are concerned with endogeneity, the baseline tests of our first hypothesis are OLS regressions of hedge fund performance (i.e., the information ratio) on parent firm location PARENT_CENTER for hedge fund i and job spell j as in:
where X is a vector of controls that might plausibly influence hedge fund performance, described above, and c indexes individual, job spell and hedge fund controls. Standard errors are clustered at the parent-firm level.
Because we rely on data generated by a non-experimental process to examine the relationship between parent firm location and spawn performance, the results are potentially affected by omitted variable bias, which may bias the results (Nickerson and Hamilton, 2003; Shaver, 1998) .
We are particularly concerned by two broad classes of selection problems: selection into job spells by managers and selection into locations by firms. Job spell selection issues are two-sided employer-employee matching problems-firms choose employees and employees choose firms-that can be analyzed in two parts: ex ante selection into parent firms and ex post selection into hedge funds. There are also two types of firm location selection decisions to consider: selection by parent firms into New York or London and hedge fund location decisions.
Thus, we have four distinct selection issues to address: (i) ex ante job spell selection, (ii) ex post job spell selection, (iii) parent firm location choice and (iv) hedge fund location choice.
Empirical strategy
We take four approaches to dealing with the selection problems. Because the approaches do not match one-to-one with the selection issues, we describe our empirical strategies before discussing how they address the four selection effects. First, as noted in expression (2), above,
we use controls to deal with observable individual and parent-firm characteristics that might directly or indirectly influence ex ante job spell selection. We, also, control directly for hedge fund location choice to deal with hedge fund location choice (selection issue (iv)).
Second, we include parent-firm fixed effects as additional controls in expression (2), one for each of the bulge bracket investment banks. The "bulge bracket" investment banks include:
Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley (Fang, 2005) . 16 Third, to deal with non-random selection ex post, and indeed with any selection effect that is correlated with the observable information about firms and workers, and to eliminate noncomparable treatment group (job spells in NYC or London) and control group observations, we use propensity score matching and Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). 17 Matching estimators 16 These firms account for nearly 50% of the observations in our sample. Our results are also robust to including dummy variables for each of the top five or ten spawning parent firms (see Table 1 for a list of top spawning firms). Ideally, we would like to run our specifications with a full set of parent firm fixed effects to control for all the observable and unobservable characteristics of a manager's previous employers that might influence a hedge fund spawn's performance. However, since our key explanatory variable does not vary over time, we cannot specify a model with a complete set of parent firm fixed effects. 17 Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) is a matching technique that is similar to propensity score matching in that it controls for selection bias by eliminating dissimilar observations in the treatment and control populations, but requires fewer post-estimation assumptions about how to define a match by matching observations exactly across a control for selection bias by creating a matched sample of treatment and control observations that are similar with respect to all observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983 Finally, we rely on the institutional context to sign the bias on the unobservable factors still lurking as potential confounds. 18 We discuss each selection issue below.
Ex ante job spell selection
Because we do not observable individual or parent firm quality directly, and these characteristics might be correlated with both the treatment (parent firm job spell in New York or London) and the outcome of interest (hedge fund performance), ex ante job spell selection issues are important to consider carefully in our context. For example, if the highest quality workers sort into NYC or London-based parent firms, then it is only natural that these workers' hedge funds outperform other hedge funds later. Even if there is no selection effect at the worker level, ex ante selection could still be problematic. For example, even if firms hired identical workers ex ante, but firms in New York or London produce higher levels of general human capital for number of dimensions simultaneously (Iacus, King and Porro. 2011.) CEM is well suited to applications where most controls are binary variables, as in our setting, since it is designed to facilitate exact matching.
their employees for reasons other than agglomeration effects (e.g., due to better training), the result of specification (2) would be biased.
While ex ante job spell selection is potentially serious, our empirical strategy mitigates the problem to a large extent. First, in specification (2) Our empirical strategy deals with unobservable parent firm-specific heterogeneity, and with ex ante selection effects based on observable characteristics of managers and parent firms, but we do not claim that we can eliminate all forms of ex ante selection bias. If worker quality and firm quality are correlated, as we might expect in the financial services industry, the combined effect of our firm quality controls, fixed effects and matching approach together deals substantially with the effect of a manger's unobservable ability. Yet, because our data is crosssectional, we are unable to control directly for the component of a manager's unobservable ability that is uncorrelated with their educational background or with their parent firm employer characteristics, but is correlated with the manager's decision to select into a job spell in New York or London. While it would seem to be somewhat unlikely that highly skilled managers would systematically have failed to demonstrate their ability in school or with a previous employer prior to joining a hedge fund, and would also systematically have chosen to work for second-tier financial institutions in New York and London, we cannot rule out this possibility.
Given the absence of a true experiment, therefore, we must interpret the results cautiously.
Ex post job spell selection
Ex post job spell selection is another potential source of selection bias. For example, if managers in parent firms in New York and London have higher opportunity costs of leaving their parent firms, then it is possible that only the best managers from these cities will select into hedge fund founding or employment. More generally, if high skill managers from parent in New
York and London systematically joined hedge funds for any reason, then the coefficient estimate on PARENT_CENTER will be biased upward. However, the data shows that we probably have the opposite problem-a bias that works against finding a result. Because managers in New York and London have better opportunities to sort into hedge funds-deeper knowledge and better connections-and hedge funds tend to be extremely lucrative ventures, they are likely to possess lower levels of unobservable ability conditional on starting (or joining) a hedge fund. We also analyzed whether there are observables differences between hedge fund managers whose job spells were from outside New York or London compared to those whose job spells were from New York or London, and found that there were no meaningful differences on any observable measure of intrinsic ability, except other post-graduate degree attainment, and that difference is eliminated by matching.
Having considered the employee component of ex post job spell selection, and concluding that any bias from such an effect is probably working against finding inherited agglomeration effects in our context, we address the issue of ex post job spell selection on the part of the hedge fund in a straightforward way. We re-run our analyses, using the sub-sample of 373 confirmed hedge fund founders (discussed in more detail below), and find very similar results. Since founders, by definition, start hedge funds, the sub-sample analysis eliminates the parent firm component of ex post selection.
Location selection by firms
Though parent firm location is also a choice variable-it is clearly not randomly assignedintuitively parent firm location selection problems would appear to be less severe for our study since most of the action in our analyses is at the job spell level. However, because firm location decisions are made strategically in anticipation of any real or perceived agglomeration effects, we do need to consider how these decisions might influence our parameter estimates.
Parent firm location decisions were typically made in the distant past. For example Goldman
Sachs was founded in New York in 1869, which suggests that any link between parent firm location choice and contemporaneous (to the sample period) agglomeration effects are unlikely to be strong. But, even though location choice is a long lived decision, there still may be a correlation between parent firm quality and location choice.
While theoretically it is ambiguous whether agglomerated centers would attract or repel the strongest financial services firms (Shaver and Flyer 2000) , the Institutional Investor rankings suggest New York and London have attracted the best trading firms. So we must ask how our results would be affected if better parent firms select into New York or London.
Econometrically, the selection problem would be manifest in the form of correlation amongst the omitted variable (i.e., firm quality), the explanatory variable and the outcome variable, an issue addressed by including controls for firm quality and by controlling for selection on observables using propensity score matching and CEM, and most importantly through the inclusion of bulge bracket dummies, which control directly for unobservable firm-specific quality for a crucial subset of parent firms.
Finally, the endogeneity of hedge fund location decisions is relatively easy to deal with since we control for hedge fund location directly. While it would be interesting to pursue the question of whether the endogeneity of hedge fund location choice is biasing our estimates of traditional agglomeration effects, doing so would be outside the scope of this paper.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Matching estimators
To implement propensity score matching, we estimate a probit of the individual and employer's joint decision to enter into an employment relationship in New York or London (i.e.
in the industry hub) and use fitted values from that model as estimates of the propensity score:
Pr(PARENT_CENTER i = 1|X ij ), where X ij includes all observable characteristics of individuals and their employer firms that might plausibly have an effect on either party's decision to enter into the employment relationship (i.e. all the individual and parent firm covariates from the OLS specification (2)). After trimming extreme values and observations off the common support of the propensity score distribution, we match each treatment to a single control group observation without replacement to obtain our matched sample.
20
- Figure 1A shows that the distributions of the propensity scores before matching are quite different between the treatment and control groups. Figure 1B shows the distributions of the propensity scores after matching. Visually there is a much tighter fit between the two groups after matching. Table 3 corroborates this result statistically. Column 1 shows the coefficients (marginal effects) from the probit model estimating the likelihood a job spell would occur in the industry hub conditional on a manager 20 We trim observations at the 10 th and 97.5 th percentiles of the distribution of the probability of the job spell occurring in New York (i.e. of the propensity score). We chose these cut points to minimize the differences in the means between the treatment and control groups, though other reasonable cut points (e.g., cutting symmetrically at 10/90 or 5/95) generated similar second stage results. One advantage of CEM is that it eliminates the subjective decision about the exact point at which to trim off extreme values.
subsequently becoming a senior member of a hedge fund, while columns 2 and 3 show the differences in the means of the covariates for the control and treatment groups before and after matching. Before matching a number of covariates are statistically different between the control and treatment groups, and the F-test for the joint difference in means between the two groups before matching is statistically significant at the 1% level. Table 3 about here
After matching the differences between the control and treatment groups decrease substantially. Only the difference in the means on RANKED remains significant at the 5% level, and the F-test for the joint significance of the differences in means between the treatment and control groups is not significant at the 10% level (p-value of 0.39). In other words, the matching approach creates treatment and control group job spells that are similar along observable dimensions ex ante.
To implement Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM), continuous variables are "coarsened" or converted into splines for the purposes of creating "bins", or discrete mutually exclusive bundles of control variables. Treatment and control observations are then matched exactly within each bin, which eliminates the need to compare the means of the treatment and control groups after matching, as the matching process forces them to be exactly equal. To avoid making ad hoc assumptions about how to cut the variables, we allow the CEM algorithm to automatically coarsen the continuous variables in our regressions. We allow for unbalanced matching within each bin, as recommended by Iacus, King and Porro (2011) . As a result, we adjust the second stage regressions (below) by the CEM sample weights so that the results can be interpreted as average treatment effects; however, the results are robust to forcing the matches to be one-to-one as with our propensity score matching approach.
Inherited agglomeration effects
Figure 2 illustrates our main results graphically by splitting out hedge fund performance into deciles by three types of managers, managers from agglomerated parents ("CENTER"), managers from non-agglomerated parents ("non-CENTER") and the sub-sample of managers who were both employed by an agglomerated parent and worked in investment management ("Inv. Mgmt. CENTER"), after matching. In all ten deciles, the managers from agglomerated parent firms outperform mangers from non-agglomerated parent firms, with the differences being significant at the 5% level in eight of the deciles. Moreover, in nine deciles managers from agglomerated parent firms who also worked in investment management outperformed other managers who worked for agglomerated parent firms, and the difference is significant at the 5% level in eight of the deciles. Table 4 shows our main result; regressions of hedge fund spawn performance (the information ratio) on parent firm location. In column 1, the coefficient estimate on PARENT_CENTER without controls is 5 basis points per month (0.05%/month), and is significant at the 5% level. Including the full set of controls, except the seven bulge bracket fixed effects, in column 2, has little effect on the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER as it increases slightly to 6 basis points per month and remains significant at the 5% level. After including seven bulge bracket firm fixed effects to control for unobservable parent-firm effects amongst the largest and most important financial institutions, the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER increases to 10 basis points per month and is significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on HF_CENTER is 4 basis points per month and significant at the 5% level (column 3). After matching control and treatment group observations using propensity score matching, the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER is 14 points per month (column 4) and is significant at the 1% level. The CEM results are nearly identical (column 5). Comparing the matched sample results to the OLS results, selection bias appears to work against finding a result in our baseline tests by biasing the coefficient estimates toward zero. Taken together, the results suggest that inherited agglomeration effects are positive, economically and statistically significant, and at least as large as conventional agglomeration effects. Table 4 about here Table 5 , we test whether inherited agglomeration effects are larger for managers with closely related experience (i.e., when hedge fund managers were previously investment managers) by interacting PARENT_CENTER with an investment management dummy. In column 1, the marginal effect of investment management experience on performance, conditional on inherited agglomeration effects is 8 basis points, but is only significant at the 10% level. However, we know from Table 4 that selection effects bias our results toward zero.
Columns (2) and (3) show that the marginal effect of investment management experience on performance is precisely estimated at 11 basis points per month after correcting for selection bias using propensity score matching and CEM, respectively. Table 5 about here
To probe inherited agglomeration effects further, we conduct two additional analyses: (i) an 21 Because the factor models, shown in equation (1) above, pick up most of the variation in performance, the R 2 s in our estimating regressions are relatively low.
analysis to ascertain whether knowledge transfers or social capital transfers, or both, appear to be driving the transference of agglomeration effects in the context of hedge funds and (ii) a subsample analysis on the set of hedge fund managers who are confirmed founders.
While our data does not allow us to measure the transference of knowledge or social capital directly, we exploit a distinction in the investment strategies of hedge funds to tease apart these two mechanisms. For most hedge funds that directly invest in financial securities, both knowledge of investment strategies and social capital are important for firm performance.
However, for fund-of-funds, which only invest in other hedge funds-in other words, are only conduits for hedge fund investments-knowledge of investment strategies, particularly the implementation of such strategies, is somewhat less important. At the same, time, social capital continues to play a crucial role in building relationships with direct investment funds and investors (Rider 2009 ). Therefore, if we find evidence for inherited agglomeration effects for direct investment funds but not for fund-of-funds, it would suggest that inherited agglomeration effects are mainly driven by trading knowledge spilling over, whereas if we find both direct investment funds and fund-of-funds experience inherited agglomeration effects that would suggest that social capital accumulation is the key mechanism behind inherited agglomeration effects.
In Table 6 , columns 1a and 1b, we split the sample into direct investment funds and fund-offunds, respectively, and rerun our regressions on these subsamples. We find that for direct investment funds the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level; however, for fund-of-funds the coefficient on PARENT_CENTER is indistinguishable from zero. While the difference between the coefficient estimates on PARENT_CENTER are not statistically different in the two samples, the results suggest that the key mechanism underlying inherited agglomeration effects in hedge funds is the spillover of technical knowledge. Table 6 about here
While not all the managers in our dataset are founders, all are senior executives who almost surely have a significant influence on the performance of the hedge fund. Still, it would be interesting to know whether our results are robust to tests on the founder-only sample, particularly because much of the spawning literature focuses on founders. To obtain this sample, we code whether the principal manager of a hedge fund firm was a founder of the hedge fund or a non-founding principal based on biographical descriptions in the MARHedge data, internet searches and an alternative hedge fund manager database (Morningstar). 22 373 jobs spells, in our sample, could be definitively associated with managers who were hedge fund founders. The remaining 285 observations were associated with non-founders, or with individuals whose founding status was indeterminate. The result of the founder sub-sample analysis, shown in Table 6 , column (2), is almost identical to the full-sample result.
CONCLUSION
This paper develops the idea of inherited agglomeration effects: economic benefits that accrue to managers while working at a parent firm in an industry hub that can be subsequently transferred to an entrepreneurial spawn when managers leave incumbent firms to manage a spawn. We test the predictions of the theory in the context of the global hedge fund industry.
The results show that hedge funds whose principal managers were previously employed by 22 We had two research assistants code whether the principal manager was involved in the founding of the hedge fund. 80% of their entries agreed. Cohen's Kappa was 0.59, which falls within the "fair to good" agreement range (0.40-0.75) according to Fleiss (1981, p.218) , and the "moderate agreement" range (0.41-0.60) according to Landis and Koch (1977) . Discrepancies were resolved on a case by case basis by the two research assistants working independently.
parent firms located in financial services industry hubs-New York or London-outperform other hedge funds by about 1.5% per year, a result that is robust to controlling for a hedge fund's systematic and idiosyncratic risk exposure, whether the manager's previous experience was with a bulge bracket parent-firm, and for selection on observables. Interestingly, the impact on performance from inherited agglomeration effects is at least as large as the effect of traditional agglomeration effects. As predicted by the theory, the core result is driven by hedge fund managers who previously worked in closely related investment management positions in New
York and London, and, at least in the context of hedge funds, the results appear to be due to knowledge-based effects over social-capital effects.
Taken together, the evidence is consistent with the idea that managers develop greater a The difference in the means for PARENT_CENTER=0 and PARENT_CENTER=1 is 4.34 basis points per month (bps/month) and the t-statistic on the difference in the means is 1.94. Table 3 shows the differences in the means for the control variables before and after matching. Marginal effects displayed for probit model in column (1) * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level Δ means are calculated as non-PARENT_CENTER population means minus PARENT_CENTER population means.
Table 4 Inherited agglomeration effects
Dependent variable: information ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) 0.15 0.14 * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level; Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust and clustered at the parent-firm level. 
